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Abstract—With the wide deployment of public cloud computing infrastructures, using clouds to host data query services has
become an appealing solution for the advantages on scalability and cost-saving. However, some data might be sensitive that the
data owner does not want to move to the cloud unless the data confidentiality and query privacy are guaranteed. On the other
hand, a secured query service should still provide efficient query processing and significantly reduce the in-house workload to
fully realize the benefits of cloud computing. We propose the RASP data perturbation method to provide secure and efficient
range query and kNN query services for protected data in the cloud. The RASP data perturbation method combines order
preserving encryption, dimensionality expansion, random noise injection, and random projection, to provide strong resilience to
attacks on the perturbed data and queries. It also preserves multidimensional ranges, which allows existing indexing techniques
to be applied to speedup range query processing. The kNN-R algorithm is designed to work with the RASP range query algorithm
to process the kNN queries. We have carefully analyzed the attacks on data and queries under a precisely defined threat model
and realistic security assumptions. Extensive experiments have been conducted to show the advantages of this approach on
efficiency and security.
Index Terms—query services in the cloud, privacy, range query, kNN query
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Hosting data-intensive query services in the cloud is
increasingly popular because of the unique advan-
tages in scalability and cost-saving. With the cloud
infrastructures, the service owners can conveniently
scale up or down the service and only pay for the
hours of using the servers. This is an attractive feature
because the workloads of query services are highly
dynamic, and it will be expensive and inefficient to
serve such dynamic workloads with in-house infras-
tructures [2]. However, because the service providers
lose the control over the data in the cloud, data
confidentiality and query privacy have become the
major concerns. Adversaries, such as curious service
providers, can possibly make a copy of the database
or eavesdrop users’ queries, which will be difficult to
detect and prevent in the cloud infrastructures.
While new approachesare needed to preserve data
confidentiality and query privacy, the efficiency of
query services and the benefits of using the clouds
should also be preserved. It will not be meaningful
to provide slow query services as a result of security
and privacy assurance. It is also not practical for
the data owner to use a significant amount of in-
house resources, because the purpose of using cloud
resources is to reduce the need of maintaining scalable
in-house infrastructures. Therefore, there is an intri-
cate relationship among the data confidentiality, query
privacy, the quality of service, and the economics of
using the cloud.
We summarize these requirements for constructing
a practical query service in the cloud as the CPEL
criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy, Efficient
query processing, and Low in-house processing cost.
Satisfying these requirements will dramatically in-
crease the complexity of constructing query services
in the cloud. Some related approaches have been
developed to address some aspects of the problem.
However, they do not satisfactorily address all of
these aspects. For example, the crypto-index [12] and
Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [1] are vulnerable
to the attacks. The enhanced crypto-index approach
[14] puts heavy burden on the in-house infrastructure
to improve the security and privacy. The New Casper
approach [24] uses cloaking boxes to protect data ob-
jects and queries, which affects the efficiency of query
processing and the in-house workload. We have sum-
marized the weaknesses of the existing approaches in
Section 7.
We propose the RAndom Space Perturbation
(RASP) approach to constructing practical range
query and k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) query services in
the cloud. The proposed approach will address all the
2four aspects of the CPEL criteria and aim to achieve a
good balance on them. The basic idea is to randomly
transform the multidimensional datasets with a com-
bination of order preserving encryption, dimension-
ality expansion, random noise injection, and random
project, so that the utility for processing range queries
is preserved. The RASP perturbation is designed in
such a way that the queried ranges are securely
transformed into polyhedra in the RASP-perturbed
data space, which can be efficiently processed with the
support of indexing structures in the perturbed space.
The RASP kNN query service (kNN-R) uses the RASP
range query service to process kNN queries. The key
components in the RASP framework include (1) the
definition and properties of RASP perturbation; (2) the
construction of the privacy-preserving range query
services; (3) the construction of privacy-preserving
kNN query services; and (4) an analysis of the attacks
on the RASP-protected data and queries.
In summary, the proposed approach has a number
of unique contributions.
• The RASP perturbation is a unique combination
of OPE, dimensionality expansion, random noise
injection, and random projection, which provides
strong confidentiality guarantee.
• The RASP approach preserves the topology of
multidimensional range in secure transformation,
which allows indexing and efficiently query pro-
cessing.
• The proposed service constructions are able to
minimize the in-house processing workload be-
cause of the low perturbation cost and high pre-
cision query results. This is an important feature
enabling practical cloud-based solutions.
We have carefully evaluated our approach with syn-
thetic and real datasets. The results show its unique
advantages on all aspects of the CPEL criteria.
The entire paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 3, we define the RASP perturbation method,
describe its major properties, and analyze the attacks
to the RASP perturbed data. We also introduce the
framework for constructing the query services with
the RASP perturbation. In Section 4 we describe the
algorithm for transforming queries and processing
range queries. In Section 5, the range query service
is extended to handle kNN queries. When describing
these two services, we also analyze the attacks on
the query privacy. Finally, we present some related
approaches in Section 7 and analyze their weaknesses
in terms of the CPEL criteria.
2 QUERY SERVICES IN THE CLOUD
This section presents the notations, the system archi-
tecture, and the threat model for the RASP approach,
and prepares for the security analysis [3] in later
sections. The design of the system architecture keeps
the cloud economics in mind so that most data storage
and computing tasks will be done in the cloud. The
threat model makes realistic security assumptions and
clearly defines the practical threats that the RASP
approach will address.
2.1 Definitions and Notations
First, we establish the notations. For simplicity, we
consider only single database tables, which can be the
result of denormalization from multiple relations. A
database table consists of n records and d searchable
attributes. We also frequently refer to an attribute as
a dimension or a column, which are exchangeable in
the paper. Each record can be represented as a vector
in the multidimensional space, denoted by low case
letters. If a record x is d-dimensional, we say x ∈ Rd,
where Rd means the d-dimensional vector space. A
table is also treated as a d × n matrix, with records
represented as column vectors. We use capital letters
to represent a table, and indexed capital letters, e.g.,
Xi, to represent columns. Each column is defined
on a numerical domain. Categorical data columns
are allows in range query, which are converted to
numerical domains as we will describe in Section 3.
Range query is an important type of query for many
data analytic tasks from simple aggregation to more
sophisticated machine learning tasks. Let T be a table
and Xi, Xj , and Xk be the real valued attributes in
T , and a and b be some constants. Take the counting
query for example. A typical range query looks like
select count(*) from T
where Xi ∈ [ai, bi] and Xj ∈ (aj , bj) and Xk =
ak,
which calculates the number of records in the range
defined by conditions on Xi, Xj , and Xk. Range
queries may be applied to arbitrary number of at-
tributes and conditions on these attributes combined
with conditional operators “and”/“or”. We call each
part of the query condition that involves only one
attribute as a simple condition. A simple condition like
Xi ∈ [ai, bi] can be described with two half space
conditions Xi ≤ bi and −Xi ≤ −ai. Without loss
of generality, we will discuss how to process half
space conditions like Xi ≤ bi in this paper. A slight
modification will extend the discussed algorithms to
handle other conditions like Xi < bi and Xi = bi.
kNN query is to find the closest k records to the
query point, where the Euclidean distance is often
used to measure the proximity. It is frequently used
in location-based services for searching the objects
close to a query point, and also in machine learning
algorithms such as hierarchical clustering and kNN
classifier. A kNN query consists of the query point
and the number of nearest neighbors, k.
2.2 System Architecture
We assume that a cloud computing infrastructure,
such as Amazon EC2, is used to host the query
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Fig. 1. The system architecture for RASP-based query
services.
services and large datasets. The purpose of this ar-
chitecture is to extend the proprietary database servers
to the public cloud, or use a hybrid private-public
cloud to achieve scalability and reduce costs while
maintaining confidentiality.
Each record x in the outsourced database con-
tains two parts: the RASP-processed attributes D′ =
F (D,K) and the encrypted original records, Z =
E(D,K ′), where K and K ′ are keys for perturbation
and encryption, respectively. The RASP-perturbed
data D′ are for indexing and query processing. Figure
1 shows the system architecture for both RASP-based
range query service and kNN service.
There are two clearly separated groups: the trusted
parties and the untrusted parties. The trusted parties
include the data/service owner, the in-house proxy
server, and the authorized users who can only submit
queries. The data owner exports the perturbed data to
the cloud. Meanwhile, the authorized users can sub-
mit range queries or kNN queries to learn statistics or
find some records. The untrusted parties include the
curious cloud provider who hosts the query services
and the protected database. The RASP-perturbed data
will be used to build indices to support query process-
ing.
There are a number of basic procedures in this
framework: (1) F (D) is the RASP perturbation that
transforms the original data D to the perturbed data
D′; (2) Q(q) transforms the original query q to the
protected form q′ that can be processed on the per-
turbed data; (3) H(q′, D′) is the query processing al-
gorithm that returns the result R′. When the statistics
such as SUM or AVG of a specific dimension are
needed, RASP can work with partial homomorphic
encryption such as Paillier encryption [25] to compute
these statistics on the encrypted data, which are then
recovered with the procedure G(R′).
2.3 Threat Model
Assumptions.Our security analysis is built on the im-
portant features of the architecture. Under this setting,
we believe the following assumptions are appropriate.
• Only the authorized users can query the propri-
etary database. Authorized users are not mali-
cious and will not intentionally breach the confi-
dentiality. We consider insider attacks are orthog-
onal to our research; thus, we can exclude the
situation that the authorized users collude with
the untrusted cloud providers to leak additional
information.
• The client-side system and the communication
channels are properly secured and no protected
data records and queries can be leaked.
• Adversaries can see the perturbed database, the
transformed queries, the whole query processing
procedure, the access patterns, and understand
the same query returns the same set of results,
but nothing else.
• Adversaries can possibly have the global infor-
mation of the database, such as the applications
of the database, the attribute domains, and pos-
sibly the attribute distributions, via other pub-
lished sources (e.g., the distribution of sales, or
patient diseases, in public reports).
These assumptions can be maintained and rein-
forced by applying appropriate security policies. Note
that this model is equivalent to the eavesdropping
model equipped with the plaintext distributional
knowledge in the cryptographic setting.
Protected Assets. Data confidentiality and query
privacy should be protected in the RASP approach.
While the integrity of query services is also an im-
portant issue, it is orthogonal to our study. Existing
integrity checking and preventing techniques [34],
[30], [19] can be integrated into our framework. Thus,
the integrity problem will be excluded from the paper,
and we can assume the curious cloud provider is
interested in the data and queries, but it will hon-
estly follow the protocol to provide the infrastructure
service.
Attacker Modeling. The goal of attack is to re-
cover (or estimate) the original data from the per-
turbed data, or identify the exact queries (i.e., location
queries) to breach users’ privacy. According to the
level of prior knowledge the attacker may have, we
categorize the attacks into two categories.
• Level 1: The attacker knows only the per-
turbed data and transformed queries, without
any other prior knowledge. This corresponds to
the cipertext-only attack in the cryptographic set-
ting.
• Level 2: The attacker also knows the original
data distributions, including individual attribute
distributions and the joint distribution (e.g., the
covariance matrix) between attributes. In prac-
tice, for some applications, whose statistics are
interesting to the public domain, the dimen-
sional distributions might have been published
via other sources.
These levels of knowledge are appropriate according
to the assumptions we hold. We will analyze the
security based on this threat model.
4Security Definition. Different from the traditional
encryption schemes, attackers can also be satisfied
with good estimation. Therefore, we will investigate
two levels of security definitions: (1) it is computa-
tionally intractable for the attacker to recover the exact
original data based on the perturbed data; (2) the at-
tacker cannot effectively estimate the original data. The
effectiveness measure is defined with the NR MSE
measure in Section 3.3.
3 RASP: RANDOM SPACE PERTURBATION
In this section, we present the basic definition of
RAndom Space Perturbation (RASP) method and its
properties. We will also discuss the attacks on RASP
perturbed data, based on the threat model given in
Section 2.
3.1 Definition of RASP
RASP is one type of multiplicative perturbation, with
a novel combination of OPE, dimension expansion,
random noise injection, and random projection. Let’s
consider the multidimensional data are numeric and
in multidimensional vector space1. The database has
k searchable dimensions and n records, which makes
a d × n matrix X . The searchable dimensions can be
used in queries and thus should be indexed. Let x
represent a d-dimensional record, x ∈ Rd. Note that
in the d-dimensional vector space Rd, the range query
conditions are represented as half-space functions and
a range query is translated to finding the point set in
corresponding polyhedron area described by the half
spaces [4].
The RASP perturbation involves three steps. Its
security is based on the existence of random invertible
real-value matrix generator and random real value
generator. For each k-dimensional input vector x,
1) An order preserving encryption (OPE) scheme
[1], Eope with keys Kope, is applied to each
dimension of x: Eope(x,Kope) ∈ Rd to change
the dimensional distributions to normal distri-
butions with each dimension’s value order still
preserved.
2) The vector is then extended to d+2 dimensions
as G(x) = ((Eopt(x))
T , 1, v)T , where the (d + 1)-
th dimension is always a 1 and the (d + 2)-
th dimension, v, is drawn from a random real
number generator RNG that generates random
values from a tailored normal distributions. We
will discuss the design of RNG and OPE later.
3) The (d + 2)-dimensional vector is finally trans-
formed to
F (x,K = {A,Kope, RG}) = A((Eope(x))T , 1, v)T ,
(1)
1. For categorical attributes, we use the following simple map-
ping because it will not break the query semantics. For a categorical
attribute Xi, the values {c1, . . . , cm} in the domain are mapped to
{1, . . . ,m}. A query condition on categorical values, say Xi = cj ,
is then converted to j − δ ≤ Xi ≤ j + δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1)
where A is a (d+2)×(d+2) randomly generated
invertible matrix with aij ∈ R such that there
are at least two non-zero values in each row of
A and the last column of A is also non-zero2.
Kope and A are shared by all vectors in the database,
but v is randomly generated for each individual
vector. Since the RASP-perturbed data records are
only used for indexing and helping query processing,
there is no need to recover the perturbed data. As
we mentioned, in the case that original records are
needed, the encrypted records associated with the
RASP-perturbed records will be returned. We give the
detailed algorithm in Appendix.
Design of OPE and RNG. We use the OPE scheme
to convert all dimensions of the original data to the
standard normal distribution N (0, 1) in the limited
domain [−β, β]. β can be selected as a value >= 4,
as the range [−4, 4] covers more than 99% of the
population. This can be done with an algorithm such
as the one described in [1]. The use of OPE allows
queries to be correctly transformed and processed.
Similarly, we draw random noises v from N (0, 1) in
the limited domain [−β, β]. Such a design makes the
extended noise dimension indifferent from the data
dimensions in terms of the distributions.
The design of such an extended data vector
(Eope(x)
T , 1, v)T is to enhance the data and query
confidentiality. The use of OPE is to transform large-
scale or infinite domains to normal distributions,
which address the distributional attack. The (d+1)-th
homogeneous dimension is for hiding the query con-
tent. The (d+2)-th dimension injects random noise in
the perturbed data and also protects the transformed
queries from attacks. The rationale behind different
aspects will be discussed clearly in later sections.
3.2 Properties of RASP
RASP has several important features. First, RASP does
not preserve the order of dimensional values be-
cause of the matrix multiplication component, which
distinguishes itself from order preserving encryption
(OPE) schemes, and thus does not suffer from the
distribution-based attack (details in Section 7). An
OPE scheme maps a set of single-dimensional values
to another, while keeping the value order unchanged.
Since the RASP perturbation can be treated as a
combined transformation F (G(Eope(x))), it is suffi-
cient to show that F (y) = Ay does not preserve the
order of dimensional values, where y ∈ Rd+2 and
A ∈ R(d+2)×(d+2). The proof is straightforward as
shown in Appendix.
Second, RASP does not preserve the distances be-
tween records, which prevents the perturbed data
2. Currently, we use a random invertible matrix generator that
draws matrix elements uniformly at random from the standard
normal distribution and check the matrix invertibility and the non-
zero conditions.
5from distance-based attacks [8]. Because none of the
transformations in the RASP: Eope,G, and F preserves
distances, apparently the RASP perturbation will not
preserve distances. Similarly, RASP does not preserve
other more sophisticated structures such as covariance
matrix and principal components [18]. Therefore, the
PCA-based attacks such as [16], [20] do not work as
well.
Third, the original range queries can be transformed
to the RASP perturbed data space, which is the ba-
sis of our query processing strategy. A range query
describes a hyper-cubic area (with possibly open
bounds) in the multidimensional space. In Section 4,
we will show that a hyper-cubic area in the original
space is transformed to a polyhedron with the RASP
perturbation. Thus, we can search the points in the
polyhedron to get the query results.
3.3 Data Confidentiality Analysis
As the threat model describes, attackers might be
interested in finding the exact original data records
or estimating them based on the perturbed data.
For estimation attack, if the estimation is sufficiently
accurate (above certain accuracy threshold), we say
the perturbation is not secure. Below, we define the
measure for evaluating the effectiveness of estimation
attacks.
3.3.1 Evaluating Effectiveness of Estimation Attacks
Because attackers may not need to exactly recover the
original values, an accurate estimation will be suffi-
cient. A measure is needed to define the “accuracy” or
“uncertainty” as we mentioned. We use the commonly
used mean-squared-error (MSE) to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of attack. To be semantically consistent, the
j-th dimension can be treated as sample values drawn
from a random variable Xj . Let xij be the value of the
i-th original record in j-th dimension and xˆij be the
estimated value. The MSE for the j-th dimension can
be defined as
MSE(Xj, Xˆj) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xij − xˆij)2,
which is equivalent to the variance: var(Xj−Xˆj). The
square root of MSE (RMSE) represent the uncertainty
of the estimation - for an estimated value xˆ, the
original value x could be in the range (xˆ - RMSE, xˆ
+RMSE). Thus, the length of the range, 2*RMSE, also
represents the accuracy of the estimation.
However, this length is subject to the length of the
domain. Thus, we use the normalized square root of
MSE (NR MSE).
NR MSE(Xj) = 2
√
MSE(Xi, Xˆj)/domain length,
(2)
instead, which is intuitively the rate between the
uncertain range and the whole domain.
To compare MSE for multiple columns, we also
need to normalize these two series {xij} and {xˆij}
to eliminate the difference on domain scales. The
normalization procedure [11] is described as follows.
Assume the mean and variance of the series {xij} is
µj and σ
2
j , correspondingly. The series is transformed
by xij ← (xij−µj)/σj . A similar procedure is also ap-
plied to the series {xˆij}. For the normalized domains,
the range [−2, 2] almost covers the whole population3
[11]. Therefore, for normalized series, NR MSE is
simply RMSE/2.
For an attack that can only result in low-accuracy
estimation (e.g., NR MSE ≥ 20%, the uncertainty
is more than 20 % of the domain length.), we call
the RASP-perturbed dataset is resilient to that attack.
Intuitively, NR MSE higher than 100% will not be
very meaningful. Thus, we set the absolute upper
bound to be 100%. We will discuss the specific upper
bounds according to the level of prior knowledge.
3.3.2 Prior-Knowledge Based Analysis
Below, we analyze the security under the two levels
of knowledge the attacker may have, according to the
two levels of security definitions: exact match and
statistical estimation.
Naive Estimation. We assume each value in the vec-
tor or matrix is encoded with n bits. Let the perturbed
vector p be drawn from a random variable P , and the
original vector x be drawn from a random variable
X . We show that naive estimation is computationally
intractable to identify the exact original data with the
perturbed data, if we use a random invertible real
matrix generator and a random real value generator.
The goal is to show the number of valid X dataset
in terms of a known perturbed dataset P . Below we
discuss a simplified version that contains no OPE
component - the OPE version has at least the same
level of security.
Proposition 1: For a known perturbed dataset P ,
there exists O(2(d+1)(d+2)n) candidate X datasets in
the original space.
Proof: For a given perturbation P = AZ , where
Z is X with the two extended dimensions, we use
Bd+1 to represent the (d + 1)-th row of A
−1. Thus,
Bd+1P = [1, . . . , 1], i.e., the appended (d+1)-th row of
Z . Keeping Bd+1 unchanged, we randomly generate
other rows of B for a candidate Bˆ. The result Zˆ = BˆP
is a validate estimate of Z if Bˆ is invertible. Thus, the
number of candidate X is the number of invertible Bˆ.
The total number of Bˆ including non-invertible
ones is 2(d+1)(d+2)n. Based on the theory of invertible
random matrix [28], the probability of generating a
non-invertible random matrix is less than exp−c(d+2)
3. For a normal distribution N(µ, σ2), the range (µ − 2σ, µ +
2σ) covers about 95% of the population. We use this length 4σ
to approximately represent the majority of population for all other
distributions, as normal distribution is a good approximation for
many applications.
6for some constant c. Thus, there are about (1 −
exp−c(d+2))2(d+1)(d+2)n invertible Bˆ. Correspondingly,
there are a same number of candidate X .
Thus, finding the exact X has a negligible probability
in terms of the number of bits, n.
As the candidates have an equal probability over
the whole domain, according to the definition of
NR MSE, the uncertain range is the same as the whole
domain, resulting in NR MSE = 100%.
Distribution-based Estimation. With the known dis-
tributional information, the attacker can do more on
estimating the original data. The known most relevant
method is called Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) [17]. For a multiplicative perturbation P = AX ,
the basic idea is to find an optimal projection, wP ,
where w is a d+ 2 dimension row vector, to result in
a row vector with its value distribution close to that
of one original attribute. It can be extended to find
a matrix W , so that WP gives independent and non-
gaussian rows, i.e., a good estimate of X .
The ICA algorithms [17], [13] are optimization al-
gorithms that try to find such projections by maxi-
mizing the non-gaussianity4 of the projection wP . The
non-gaussianity of the original attributions is crucial
because any projection of a multidimensional normal
distribution is still a normal distribution, which leaves
no clue for recovery.
Therefore, with our design of OPE and the noise
dimension in Section 3, we have the following result.
Proposition 2: There are O(2dn) candidate projec-
tion vectors, w, that lead to the same level of non-
gaussianity.
Proof: The OPE encrypted matrix X¯ (with the
homogeneous dimension excluded, which can be pos-
sibly recovered) can be treated as a sample set drawn
from a multivariate normal distribution N (µ,Σ). Any
invertible transformation P¯ = A¯X¯ will result in an-
other multivariate normal distribution N (A¯µ, A¯ΣA¯T ).
Thus, any projection wP¯ will not change the gaussian-
ity, and there are O(2dn) such candidates of w.
Thus, the probability to identify the right projection
is negligible in terms of the number of bits n. This
shows that any ICA-style estimation that depends
on non-guassianity is equally ineffective to the RASP
perturbation.
In addition to ICA, Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) based attack is another possible distributional
attack, which, however, depends on the preservation
of covariance matrix [20]. Because the covariance
matrix is not preserved in RASP perturbation, the
PCA attack cannot be used on RASP perturbed data.
It is unknown whether there are other distributional
methods for approximately separating X or A from
the perturbed data P , which will be studied in the
ongoing work.
4. Non-gaussianity means the distribution is not normal distri-
bution.
In the worst-case estimation, the attacker can sim-
ply draw a sample of Xˆj from the known distribution
of the original Xj ; thus, Xj and Xˆj are independent
but have the same distribution. It follows thatMSE =
var(Xj − Xˆj) = var(Xj) + var(Xˆj) = 2var(Xj) =
2σ2. Correspondingly, NR MSE = (2
√
MSE)/(4σ) =√
2/2 ≈ 71%.
4 RASP RANGE-QUERY PROCESSING
Based on the RASP perturbation method, we design
the services for two types of queries: range query and
kNN query. This section will dedicate to range query
processing. We will first show that a range query in
the original space can be transformed to a polyhedron
query in the perturbed space, and then we develop a
secure way to do the query transformation. Then, we
will develop a two-stage query processing strategy for
efficient range query processing.
4.1 Transforming Range Queries
Let’s look at the general form of a range query
condition. Let Xi be an attribute in the database. A
simple condition in a range query involves only one
attribute and is of the form “Xi <op> ai”, where ai
is a constant in the normalized domain of Xi and
op ∈ {<,>,=,≤,≥, 6=} is a comparison operator. For
convenience we will only discuss how to process
Xi < ai, while the proposed method can be slightly
changed for other conditions. Any complicated range
query can be transformed into the disjunction of a
set of conjunctions, i.e.,
⋃n
j=1(
⋂m
i=1 Ci,j), where m,n
are some integers depending on the original query
conditions and Ci,j is a simple condition about Xi.
Again, to simplify the presentation we restrict our
discussion to a single conjunction condition ∩mi=1Ci,
where Ci is in form of bi ≤ Xi ≤ ai. Such a
conjunction conditions describes a hyper-cubic area
in the multidimensional space.
According to the three nested transformations in
RASP F (G(Eope(x))), we will first show that an OPE
will transform the original hyper-cubic area to another
hyper-cubic area in the OPE space.
Proposition 1: Order preserving encryption func-
tions transform a hyper-cubic query range to another
hyper-cubic query range.
Proof: The original range query condition consists
of simple conditions like bi ≤ Xi ≤ ai for each
dimension. Since the order is preserved, each sim-
ple condition is transformed as follows: Eope(bi) ≤
Eope(Xi) ≤ Eope(ai), which means the transformed
range is still a hyper-cubic query range.
Let y = Eope(x) and ci = Eope(ai). A simple
condition Yi ≤ ci defines a half-space. With the
extended dimensions zT = (yT , 1, v), the half-space
can be represented as wT z ≤ 0, where w is a d + 2
dimensional vector with wi = 1, wd+1 = −ci, and
wj = 0 for j 6= i, d + 1. Finally, let u = Az, according
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to the RASP transformations. With this representation,
the original condition is equivalent to
wTA−1u ≤ 0 (3)
in the RASP-perturbed space, which is still a half-
space condition. However, this half-space condition
will not be parallel to the coordinate - these trans-
formed conditions together form a polyhedron (as
illustrated in Figure 3. The query service will need
to find the records in the polyhedron area, which is
supported by the two-stage processing algorithm.
4.2 Security Enhancement on Query Transforma-
tion
The attacker may also target on the transformed
queries. In this section we discuss such attacks and
describe the methods countering the attacks. Note that
the attack on small ranges will be described in kNN
query processing.
Countering Dimensional Selection Attack We show
that the dimensional selection attack can reveal par-
tial information of the selected data dimensions, if
the attacker knows the distribution of the dimen-
sion. Assume the query condition is applied to the
i-th dimension. If the query parameter wTA−1 is
directly submitted to the cloud side, the server can
apply wTA−1 to each record u in the server, and get
wTA−1u = Eope(xi) − Eope(ai), where xi is the i-
th dimension of the corresponding original record x.
After getting all such values for the dimension i, with
the known original data distributions, the attacker can
apply the bucket-based distributional attack on the
OPE encrypted data (see Section 7) to get an accurate
estimate.
According to the design of noise, the extended (d+
2)-th dimension v in the RASP perturbation: F (x) =
A(Eope(x)
T , 1, v)T is always greater than v0, which
can be used to construct secure query conditions. In-
stead of processing a half space condition Eope(Xi) ≤
Eope(ai), we use (Eope(Xi) − Eope(ai))(v − v0) ≤ 0
instead. These two conditions are equivalent because
v always satisfies v > v0. Using the similar transfor-
mations, we get Eope(Xi) − Eope(ai) = wTA−1u and
v = qTA−1u, where qd+2 = −1, qd+1 = v0, and qj = 0,
for j 6= d. Thus, we get the transformed quadratic
query condition
uT (A−1)TwqTA−1u ≤ 0. (4)
Let Θi = (A
−1)TwqTA−1. Now Θ is submitted to the
server and the server will use uTΘiu ≤ 0 to filter out
the results.
We now show that this query transformation is
resilient to the dimensional selection attack. Apply-
ing uTΘu to each record u, we get (Eope(Xi) −
Eope(ai))(v− v0). Since v is randomly chosen for each
record, the value Eope(Xi) − Eope(ai) is protected by
the randomization. Θi does not reveal the key param-
eters as well. Let ci = Eope(ai) and ai be the i-th row
of A−1. Θi is (ai− ciad+1)T (v0ad+1− ad+2). As all the
components: ai, ci, ad+1, and ad+2 are unknown and
cannot be further reduced, Θi provide no information
to help drive information about A−1.
Other Potential Threats. Because the query transfor-
mation method does not introduce randomness - the
same query will always get the same transformation,
and thus the confidentiality of access pattern is not
preserved. We summarize the leaked information re-
lated to access patterns as follows.
• Attackers know the exact frequency of each trans-
formed query.
• The set relationships (set intersection, union, dif-
ference, etc.) between the query results are re-
vealed as a result of exact range query processing.
• Some query matrices on the same dimension may
have special relationship preserved as shown in
Proposition 3, which we will discuss later.
We admit this is a weakness of the current design.
However, according to the threat model, the adversary
will not know any of the original data and queries.
Thus, by simply observing the query frequency or re-
lationships between queries, one cannot derive useful
information. An important future work is to formally
define the specific information leakage caused by the
leaked query and access patterns, and then precisely
analyze the data and query confidentiality affected
by this information leakage under different security
assumptions.
4.3 A Two-Stage Query Processing Strategy with
Multidimensional Index Tree
With the transformed queries, the next important task
is to process queries efficiently and return precise
results to minimize the client-side post-processing
effects. A commonly used method is to use multi-
dimensional tree indices to improve the search per-
formance. However, multidimensional tree indices
are normally used to process axis-aligned “bounding
boxes”; whereas, the transformed queries are in ar-
bitrary polyhedra, not necessarily aligned to axes. In
this section, we propose a two-stage query processing
strategy to handle such irregular-shape queries in the
perturbed space.
Multidimensional Index Tree. Most multidimen-
sional indexing algorithms are derived from R-tree
like algorithms [22], where the axis-aligned minimum
8bounding region (MBR) is the construction block for
indexing the multidimensional data. For 2D data, an
MBR is a rectangle. For higher dimensions, the shape
of MBR is extended to hyper-cube. Figure 2 shows the
MBRs in the R-tree for a 2D dataset, where each node
is bounded by a node MBR. The R-tree range query
algorithm compares the MBR and the queried range
to find the answers.
The Two-Stage Processing Algorithm. The trans-
formed query describes a polyhedron in the perturbed
space that cannot be directly processed by multi-
dimensional tree algorithms. New tree search algo-
rithms could be designed to use arbitrary polyhedron
conditions directly for search. However, we use a
simpler two-stage solution that keeps the existing tree
search algorithms unchanged.
At the first stage, the proxy in the client side finds
the MBR of the polyhedron (as a part of the submitted
transformed query) and submit the MBR and a set of
secured query conditions {Θ1, . . . ,Θm} to the server.
The server then uses the tree index to find the set of
records enclosed by the MBR.
The MBR of the polyhedron can be efficiently
founded based on the original range. The original
query condition constructs a hyper-cube shape. With
the described query transformation, the vertices of the
hyper cube are also transformed to vertices of the
polyhedron. Therefore, the MBR of the vertices is also
the MBR of the polyhedron [27]. Figure 3 illustrates
the relationship between the vertices and the MBR
and the two-stage processing strategy.
At the second stage, the server uses the transformed
halfspace conditions to filter the initial result. In most
cases of tight ranges, the initial result set will be
reasonably small so that it can be filtered in mem-
ory by simply checking the transformed half-space
conditions. However, in the worst case, the MBR of
the polyhedron will possibly enclose the entire dataset
and the second stage is reduced to a linear scan of the
entire dataset. The result of second stage will return
the exact range query result to the proxy server, which
significantly reduces the post-processing cost that the
proxy server needs to take. It is very important to the
cloud-based service, because low post-processing cost
requires low in-house investment.
5 KNN QUERY PROCESSING WITH RASP
Because the RASP perturbation does not preserve
distances (and distance orders), kNN query cannot be
directly processed with the RASP perturbed data. In
this section, we design a kNN query processing algo-
rithm based on range queries (the kNN-R algorithm).
As a result, the use of index in range query processing
also enables fast processing of kNN queries.
5.1 Overview of the kNN-R Algorithm
The original distance-based kNN query processing
finds the nearest k points in the spherical range that
is centered at the query point. The basic idea of our
algorithm is to use square ranges, instead of spherical
ranges, to find the approximate kNN results, so that
the RASP range query service can be used. There
are a number of key problems to make this work
securely and efficiently. (1) How to efficiently find
the minimum square range that surely contains the k
results, without many interactions between the cloud
and the client? (2) Will this solution preserve data
confidentiality and query privacy? (3) Will the proxy
server’s workload increase? to what extent?
The algorithm is based on square ranges to approx-
imately find the kNN candidates for a query point,
which are defined as follows.
Definition 1: A square range is a hyper-cube that
is centered at the query point and with equal-length
edges.
Figure 5 illustrates the range-query-based kNN pro-
cessing with two-dimensional data. The Inner Range
is the square range that contains at least k points,
and the Outer Range encloses the spherical range
that encloses the inner range. The outer range surely
contains the kNN results (Proposition 2) but it may
also contain irrelevant points that need to be filtered
out.
Proposition 2: The kNN-R algorithm returns results
with 100% recall.
Proof: The sphere in Figure 5 between the outer
range and the inner range covers all points with dis-
tances less than the radius r. Because the inner range
contains at least k points, there are at least k nearest
neighbors to the query points with distances less than
the radius r. Therefore, the k nearest neighbors must
be in the outer range.
The kNN-R algorithm consists of two rounds of
interactions between the client and the server. Figure 4
demonstrates the procedure. (1) The client will send
the initial upper-bound range, which contains more
than k points, and the initial lower-bound range,
which contains less than k points, to the server. The
server finds the inner range and returns to the client.
(2) The client calculates the outer range based on the
inner range and sends it back to the server. The server
finds the records in the outer range and sends them
to the client. (3) The client decrypts the records and
find the top k candidates as the final result.
If the points are approximately uniformly dis-
tributed, we can estimate the precision of the returned
result. With the uniform assumption, the number of
points in an area is proportional to the size of the area.
If the inner range contains m points, m >= k, the
outer range contains q points, and the dimensionality
is d, we can derive q = 2d/2m. Thus, the precision is
k/q = k/(2d/2m). If m ≈ k and d = 2, the precision is
around 0.5. When d increases, the precision decreases
exponentially due to the curse of dimensionality [23],
which suggests kNN-R should not work effectively on
high-dimensional data. We will show this weakness in
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experiments.
5.2 Finding Compact Inner Square Range
An important step in the kNN-R algorithm is to
find the compact inner square range to achieve high
precision. In the following, we give the (k, δ)-range
for efficiently finding the compact inner range.
Definition 2: A (k, δ)-range is any square range cen-
tered at the query point, the number of points in
which is in the range [k, k + δ], δ is a nonnegative
integer.
We design an algorithm similar to binary search
to efficiently find the (k, δ)-range. Suppose a square
range centered at the query point with length of L
in each dimension is represented as S(L). Let the
number of points included by this range is N (L). If
a square range S(in) is enclosed by another square
range S(out), we say S(in) ⊂ S(out). It directly follows
that N (in) ≤ N (out), and also
Corollary 1: If N (1) < N (2), S(1) ⊂ S(2).
Using this definition and notation, we can always
construct a series of enclosed square ranges centered
on the query point: S(L1) ⊂ S(L2) ⊂ . . . ,⊂ S(Lm).
Correspondingly, the numbers of points enclosed by
{S(Li)} have the ordering N (L1) ≤ N (L2) ≤ . . .N (Lm).
Assume that S(L1) is the initial range containing less
than k points and S(Lm) is the initial upper bound
range; both are sent by the client. The problem of
finding the compact inner range S can be mapped
to a binary search over the sequence {S(Li)}.
In each step of the binary search, we start with a
lower bound range, denoted as S(low) and a higher
bound range, S(high). We want the corresponding
numbers of enclosed points to satisfy N (low) < k ≤
N (high) in each step, which is achieved with the
following procedure. First, we find the middle square
range S(mid), where mid = (low + high)/2. If S(mid)
covers no less than k points, the higher bound: S(high)
is updated to S(mid); otherwise, the lower bound:
S(low) is updated to S(mid). At the beginning step
S(low) is set to S(L1) and S(high) is S(Lm). This process
repeats until N (mid) < k + δ or high − low < E ,
where E is some small positive number. Algorithm
4 in Appendix describes these steps.
Selection of Initial Inner/Outer Bounds. The se-
lection of initial inner bound can be the query point.
If the query point is q(q1, . . . , qd), S
(L1) is a hyper-
cube defined by {qi ≥ Xi ≥ qi, i = 1 . . . d}. The naive
selection of S(Lm) would be the whole domain. How-
ever, we can effectively reduce the range with a coarse
density map organized in a tiny flat multidimensional
tree, which can be included in the preprocessing step
in the client side. The details will be ignored due to
the space limitation.
5.3 Finding Inner Range with RASP Perturbed
Data
Algorithm 4 gives the basic ideas of finding the com-
pact inner range in iterations. There are two critical
operations in this algorithm: (1) finding the number
of points in a square range and (2) updating the higher
and lower bounds. Because range queries are secured
in the RASP framework, the key is to update the
bounds with the secured range queries, without the
help of the client-side proxy server.
As discussed in the RASP query processing, a range
query such as S(L) is encoded as the MBR(L) of its
polyhedron range in the perturbed space and the 2(d+
2) dimensional conditions. yTΘ
(L)
i y ≤ 0 determining
the sides of the polyhedron, and each of the d + 2
extended dimensions gets a pair of conditions for the
upper and lower bounds, respectively.
The problem of binary range search is to use the
higher bound range S(high) and the lower bound
range S(low) to derive S(mid). When all of these
ranges are secured, the problem is transformed to
(1) deriving Θ
(mid)
i from Θ
(high)
i and Θ
(low)
i ; and (2)
deriving MBR(mid) fromMBR(high) and MBR(low). The
following discussion will be focused on the simplified
RASP version without the OPE component, which
will be extended with the OPE component.
We show that
Proposition 3:
(Θ
(high)
i +Θ
(low)
i )/2 = Θ
(mid)
i .
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Proof: Remember that Θi for Xi < ci can be
represented as (ai − ciad+1)T (v0ad+1 − ad+2), where
ai is the i-th row of the matrix A. Let the conditions
be Xi < h, Xi < l, and Xi < (h+l)/2 for the high, low,
and middle bounds, correspondingly. Thus, (Θ
(high)
i +
Θ
(low)
i )/2 = (ai − ((h + l)/2)ad+1)T (v0ad+1 − ad+2),
which is Θ
(mid)
i .
As we have mentioned, the MBR of an arbitrary
polyhedron can be derived based on the vertices of
the polyhedron. A polyhedron is mapped to another
polyhedron after the RASP perturbation. Concretely,
let a polyhedron P hasm vertices {x1, . . . , xm}, which
are mapped to the vertices in the perturbed space:
{y1, . . . , ym}. Then, the upper bound and lower bound
of dimension j of the MBR of the polyhedron in
the perturbed space are determined by max{yij, i =
1 . . .m} and min{yij , i = 1 . . .m}, respectively.
Let the j-th dimension of MBR(L) represented as
[s
(L)
j,min, s
(L)
j,max], where s
(L)
j,min = min{y(L)ij , i = 1 . . .m},
and s
(L)
j,max = max{y(high)ij , i = 1 . . .m}. Now we
choose the MBR(MID) as follows: for j-th dimension
we use [(s
(low)
j,min + s
(high)
j,min )/2, (s
(low)
j,max + s
(high)
j,max )/2]. We
show that
Proposition 4: MBR(MID) encloses MBR(mid).
The details of proof can be found in Appendix. Be-
cause the MBR is only used for the first stage of range
query processing, a slightly larger MBR still encloses
the polyhedron, which guarantees the correctness of
the two-stage range query processing.
Including the OPE component. The results on
Θ
(mid)
i and MBR
(MID) can be extended to the RASP
scheme with the OPE component. However, due to
the introduction of the order preserving function fi(),
the middle point may not be strictly the middle point,
but somewhere between the higher bound and lower
bound. We use “between”(btw) to denote it.
Specifically, if Xi < h and Xi < l are the corre-
sponding conditions for the higher and lower bounds.
Let the condition for the “between” bound be Xi < b
that satisfies fi(b) = (fi(h) + fi(l))/2. According to
the OPE property, we have l < b < h, i.e., the
corresponding range is still between the lower range
and higher range. Therefore, the same binary search
algorithm can still be applied, according to Corollary
1. The server can also derive (Θ
(high)
i + Θ
(low)
i )/2 =
(ai − ((fi(h) + fi(l))/2)ad+1)T (v0ad+1 − ad+2) = Θbtwi ,
a result similar to Proposition 3.
Similarly, we define MBR(BTW ) with
fi(s
(BTW )
i,max ) = (fi(s
(low)
i,max) + fi(s
(high)
i,max ))/2 and
fi(s
(BTW )
i,min ) = (fi(s
(low)
i,min) + fi(s
(high)
i,min ))/2, while
MBR(btw) is defined based on the vertices to be
consistent with Θ
(btw)
i . Because the relationships Eq.
6 and 7 in Appendix are still true with the OPE
transformation fi(), we can prove that MBR
(BTW )
also encloses MBR(btw). Due to the space limitation,
we skip the details.
5.4 Defining Initial Bounds
The complexity of the (k, δ)-range algorithm is deter-
mined by the initial bounds provided by the client.
Thus, it is important to provide compact ones to
help the server process queries more efficiently. The
initial lower bound is defined as the query point.
For q(q1, . . . , qd), the dimensional bounds are simply
qj ≤ Xj ≤ qj .
The higher bounds can be defined in multiple ways.
(1) Applications often have a user-specified interest
bound, for example, returning the nearest gas station
in 5 miles, which can be used to define the higher
bound. (2) We can also use center-distance based
bound setting. Let the query point has a distance γ
to the distribution center - as we always work on
normalized distributions, the center is (0, . . . , 0). The
upper bound is defined as qj − ǫγ ≤ Xj ≤ qj + ǫγ,
where epsilon ∈ (0, 1] defines the level of conservativ-
ity. (3) If it is really expected to include all candidate
kNN regardless how distant they are, we can include
a rough density-map (a multidimensional histgram)
for quickly identifying the appropriate higher bound.
However, this method works best for low dimensional
data as the number of bins exponentially increases
with the number of dimensions. In experiments, we
simply use the method (1) and 5% of the domain
length for the extension.
5.5 Security of kNN Queries
As all kNN queries are completely transformed to
range queries, the security of kNN queries are equiva-
lent to the security of range queries. According to the
previous discussion in Section 4.2, the transformed
range queries are secure under the assumptions.
Therefore, the kNN queries are also secure. Detailed
proofs have to be skipped for space limitation.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present four sets of experimental
results to investigate the following questions, corre-
spondingly. (1) How expensive is the RASP pertur-
bation? (2) How resilient the OPE enhanced RASP
is to the ICA-based attack? (3) How efficient is the
two-stage range query processing? (4) How efficient
is the kNN-R query processing and what are the
advantages?
6.1 Datasets
Three datasets are used in experiments. (1) A synthetic
dataset that draws samples from uniform distribu-
tion in the range [0, 1]. (2) The Adult dataset from
UCI machine learning database5. We assign numeric
values to the categorical values using a simple one-
to-one mapping scheme, as described in Section 3.
(3) The 2-dimensional NorthEast location data from
rtreeportal.org.
5. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
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Fig. 6. The cost distribution of the full RASP
scheme. Data: Adult (20K records,5-9 dimensions)
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Fig. 7. Randomly generated matrix A and the
progressive resilience to ICA attack. Data: Adult
(10 dimensions, 10K records)
6.2 Cost of RASP Perturbation
In this experiment, we study the costs of the com-
ponents in the RASP perturbation. The major costs
can be divided into two parts: the OPE and the rest
part of RASP. We implement a simple OPE scheme [1]
by mapping original column distributions to normal
distributions. The OPE algorithm partitions the target
distribution into buckets. Then, the sorted original
values are proportionally partitioned according to the
target bucket distribution to create the buckets for the
original distribution. With the aligned original and
target buckets, an original value can be mapped to
the target bucket and appropriately scaled. Therefore,
the encryption cost mainly comes from the bucket
search procedure (proportional to logD, where D
is the number of buckets). Figure 6 shows the cost
distributions for 20K records at different number of
dimensions. The dimensionality has slight effects on
the cost of RASP perturbation. Overall, the cost of
processing 20K records is only around 0.1 second.
6.3 Resilience to ICA Attack
We have discussed the methods for countering the
ICA distributional attack on the perturbed data. In
this set of experiments, we evaluate how resilient the
RASP perturbation is to the distributional attack.
Results. We simulate the ICA attack for randomly
chosen matrices A. The data used in the experiment
is the 10-dimensional Adult data with 10K records.
Figure 7 shows the progressive results in a number
of randomly chosen matrices A. The x-axis represents
the total number of rounds for randomly choosing
the matrix A; the y-axis represents the minimum
dimensional NR MSE among all dimension. With-
out OPE, the label “Best-without-OPE” represents
the most resilient A at the round i, “Worst-without-
OPE” represents the A of the weakest resilience, and
“Average-without-OPE” is the average quality of the
generated Amatrices for i rounds. We see that the best
case is already close to the upper bound 0.7 (Section
3.3). With the OPE component, the worst case can also
be significantly improved.
6.4 Performance of Two-stage Range Query Pro-
cessing
In this set of experiments, we study the performance
aspects of polyhedron-based range query processing.
We use the two-stage processing strategy described in
Section 4, and explore the additional cost incurred by
this processing strategy. We implement the two-stage
query processing based on an R*tree implementation
provided by Dr. Hadjieleftheriou at AT&T Lab6. The
block size is 4KB and we allow each block to contain
only 20 entries to mimic a large database with many
disk blocks. Samples from the original databases in
different size (10,000 − 50,000 records, i.e., 500-2500
data blocks) are perturbed and indexed for query
processing. Another set of indices is also built on
the original data for the performance comparison
with non-perturbed query processing. We will use the
number of disk block accesses, including index blocks
and data blocks, to assess the performance to avoid
the possible variation caused by other parts of the
computer system. In addition, we will also show the
wall-clock time for some results.
Recall the two-stage processing strategy: using the
MBR to search the indexing tree, and filtering the
returned result with the secured query in quadratic
form. We will study the performance of the first stage
by comparing it to two additional methods: (1) the
original queries with the index built on the original
data, which is used to identify how much additional
6. http://www2.research.att.com/ marioh/spatialindex/
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cost is paid for querying the MBR of the trans-
formed query; (2) the linear scan approach, which
is the worst case cost. Range queries are generated
randomly within the domain of the datasets, and
then transformed with the method described in the
Section 4. We also control the range of the queries to
be [10%,20%,30%,40%,50%] of the total range of the
domain, to observe the effect of the scale of the range
to the performance of query processing.
Results. The first pair of figures (the left subfigures of
Figure 8 and 9) shows the number of block accesses
for 10,000 queries on different sizes of data with differ-
ent query processing methods. For clear presentation,
we use log10(# of block accesses) as the y-axis. The
cost of linear scan is simply the number of blocks for
storing the whole dataset. The data dimensionality is
fixed to 5 and the query range is set to 30% of the
whole domain. Obviously, the first stage with MBR for
polyhedron has a cost much cheaper than the linear
scan method and only moderately higher than R*tree
processing on the original data. Interestingly, different
distributions of data result in slightly different pat-
terns. The costs of R*tree on transformed queries are
very close to those of original queries for Adult data,
while the gap is larger on uniform data. The costs
over different dimensions and different query ranges
show similar patterns.
Linear Scan R*Tree-Orig PrepQ Stage-1 Stage-2 rpq purity
Uniform5D 21.12 0.27 0.007 4.19 0.01 51.92 7.76%
Adult5D 16.28 0.39 0.007 1.9 0.01 5.12 1.17%
TABLE 1
Wall clock cost distribution (milliseconds) and
comparison.
We also studied the cost of the second stage. We use
“PrepQ” to represent the client-side cost of transform-
ing queries, “purity” to represent the rate (final result
count)/(1st stage result count), and records per query
(“RPQ”) to represent the average number of records
per query for the first stage results. The quadratic
filtering conditions are used in experiments. Table 1
compares the average wall-clock time (milliseconds)
per query for the two stages, the RPQ values for stage
1, and the purity of the stage-1 result. The tests are
run with the setting of 10K queries, 20K records, 30%
dimensional query range and 5 dimensions. Since the
2nd stage is done in memory, its cost is much lower
than the 1st-stage cost. Overall, the two stage process-
ing is much faster than linear scan and comparable to
the original R*Tree processing.
6.5 Performance of kNN-R Query Processing
In this set of experiments, we investigate several
aspects of kNN query processing. (1) We will study
the cost of (k, δ)-Range algorithm, which mainly
contributes to the server-side cost. (2) We will show
the overall cost distribution over the cloud side and
the proxy server. (3) We will show the advantages of
kNN-R over another popular approach: the Casper
approach [24] for privacy-preserving kNN search.
(k, δ)-Range Algorithms In this set of experiments,
we want to understand how the setting of the δ
parameter affects the performance and the result
precision. Figure 10 shows the effect of δ setting
to the (k, δ)-range algorithm. Both datasets are two-
dimensional data. As δ becomes larger, both the pre-
cision and the number of rounds needs to reach the
δ condition decreases. Note that each round corre-
sponds to one server-side range query. The choice of
δ represents a tradeoff between the precision and the
performance.
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Fig. 10. Performance and result
precision for different δ setting of
the (k, δ)-range algorithm for 2-
dimensional data.
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Fig. 11. Preci-
sion reduction
with more
dimension.
As we have discussed, the major weakness with
the kNN-R algorithm is the precision reduction with
increased dimensionality. When the dimensionality
increases, the precision can significantly drop, which
will increase the cost of post-processing in the client
side. Figure 11 shows this phenomenon with the real
Adult data and the simulated uniform data. However,
compared to the overall cost, the client-side cost in-
crease is still acceptable. We will show the comparison
next.
Overall Costs. Many secure approaches cannot use
indices for query processing, which results in poor
performance. For example, the secure dot-product
approach [33] encodes the points with random projec-
tions and recovers dot-products in query processing
for distance comparison. The way of encoding data
disallows the index-based query processing. Without
the aid of indices, processing a kNN query will have
to scan the entire database, leaving many optimization
impossible to implement.
One concern with the kNN-R approach is the work-
load on the proxy server. Different from range query,
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Fig. 8. Performance comparison on Uniform data. Left: data size vs. cost of query; Middle: data dimensionality
vs. cost of query; Right: query range (percentage of the domain) vs. cost of query
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Fig. 9. Performance comparison on Adult data. Left: data size vs. cost of query; Middle: data dimensionality vs.
cost of query; Right: query range (percentage of the domain) vs. cost of query
the proxy server will need to filter out the points
returned by the server to find the final kNN. A
reduced precision due to the increased dimensionality
will imply an increased burden for the proxy server.
We need to show how significant this proxy cost is.
We use the database of 100 thousands of data points
and 1000 randomly selected queries for the 1NN
experiment. The wall clock time (milliseconds) is used
to show the average cost per query in Table 2. We
also list the cost of the secure dot-product method
[33] for comparison. Table 2 shows that the proxy
server takes a negligible pre-processing cost and a
very small post-processing cost, even for reduced
precision in the 5D datasets. We use 5% domain length
to extend the query point to form the initial higher
bound. Compared to the dot-product method, the
user-specified higher bound setting can cut off unin-
teresting regions, giving significant performance gain
for sparse or skewed datasets, such as Adult5D. This
cut-off effect cannot be implemented with the dot-
product method. Furthermore, even for dense cases
like the 2D datasets, the overall cost is only about
half of the dot-product method.
Comparing kNN-R with the Casper Approach. In
this set of experiments, we compare our approach
and the Casper approach with a focus on the tradeoff
between the data confidentiality and the query result
precision (which indicates the workload of the in-
house proxy). Based on the description in the paper
[24], we implement the 1NN query processing algo-
rithm for the experiment.
The Casper approach uses cloaking boxes to hide
Data& setting Liner Scan Pre-processing Server Cost Post-processing
Uniform2D/kNN-R 27.37 0.01 13.54 0.04
Adult2D/kNN-R 26.09 0.01 14.48 0.06
Uniform5D/kNN-R 33.03 0.01 13.79 0.34
Adult5D/kNN-R 31.96 0.01 2.56 0.05
TABLE 2
Per-query performance comparison (milliseconds)
between linear scan on the original non-perturbed
data and index-aided kNN-R processing on perturbed
data.
both the original data points in the database and the
query points. It can also use the index to process
kNN queries. The confidentiality of data in Casper
is solely defined by the size of cloaking box. Roughly
speaking, the actual point has the same probability
to be anywhere in the cloaking box. However, the
size of cloaking box also directly affects the precision
of query results. Thus, the decision on the box size
represents a tradeoff between the precision of query
results and the data confidentiality.
For clear presentation, we assume each dimension
has the same length of domain, h and each cloak-
ing box is square with an edge-length e. Assume
the whole domain also has a uniform distribution.
According to the variance of uniform distribution,
the NR MSE measure is
√
6e/(3h). To achieve the
protection of 10% domain length, we have e ≈ 0.12h.
In Figure 12, the x-axis represents NR MSE, i.e.,
the Casper’s relative cloaking-edge length. It shows
that when the edge length is increased from 2% to
10%, the precision dramatically drops from 62% to
14
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Fig. 12. The impact of cloaking-box size on precision
for Casper for the NE data.
13% for the 2D uniform data and 43% to 10% for the
2D NE data, which shows the severe conflict between
precision and confidentiality. The kNN-R’s results are
also shown for comparison.
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Protecting Outsourced Data
Order Preserving Encryption. Order preserving en-
cryption (OPE) [1] preserves the dimensional value or-
der after encryption. It can be described as a function
y = F (x), ∀xi, xj , xi < (>,=)xj ⇔ yi < (>,=)yj . A
well-known attack is based on attacker’s prior knowl-
edge on the original distributions of the attributes.
If the attacker knows the original distributions and
manages to identify the mapping between the original
attribute and its encrypted counterpart, a bucket-
based distribution alignment can be performed to
break the encryption for the attribute [6]. There are
some applications of OPE in outsourced data process-
ing. For example, Yiu et al. [21] uses a hierarchical
space division method to encode spatial data points,
which preserves the order of dimensional values and
thus is one kind of OPE.
Crypto-Index. Crypto-Index is also based on
column-wise bucketization. It assigns a random ID
to each bucket; the values in the bucket are replaced
with the bucket ID to generate the auxiliary data for
indexing. To utilize the index for query processing, a
normal range query condition has to be transformed
to a set-based query on the bucket IDs. For example,
Xi < ai might be replaced with X
′
i ∈ [ID1, ID2, ID3].
A bucket-diffusion scheme [14] was proposed to pro-
tect the access pattern, which, however, has to sacrifice
the precision of query results, and thus increase the
client’s cost of filtering the query result.
Distance-Recoverable Encryption. DRE is the most
intuitive method for preserving the nearest neighbor
relationship. Because of the exactly preserved dis-
tances, many attacks can be applied [33], [20], [8].
Wong et al. [33] suggest preserving dot products
instead of distances to find kNN, which is more
resilient to distance-targeted attacks. One drawback
is the search algorithm is limited to linear scan and
no indexing method can be applied.
7.2 Preserving Query Privacy
Private information retrieval (PIR) [9] tries to fully
preserve the privacy of access pattern, while the data
may not be encrypted. PIR schemes are normally very
costly. Focusing on the efficiency side of PIR, Williams
et al. [32] use a pyramid hash index to implement effi-
cient privacy preserving data-block operations based
on the idea of Oblivious RAM. It is different from our
setting of high throughput range query processing.
Hu et al. [15] addresses the query privacy problem
and requires the authorized query users, the data
owner, and the cloud to collaboratively process kNN
queries. However, most computing tasks are done
in the user’s local system with heavy interactions
with the cloud server. The cloud server only aids
query processing, which does not meet the principle
of moving computing to the cloud.
Papadopoulos et al. [26] uses private information
retrieval methods [9] to enhance location privacy.
However, their approach does not consider protecting
the confidentiality of data. SpaceTwist [35] proposes a
method to query kNN by providing a fake user’s loca-
tion for preserving location privacy. But the method
does not consider data confidentiality, as well. The
Casper approach [24] considers both data confiden-
tiality and query privacy, the detail of which has been
discussed in our experiments.
7.3 Other Related Work
Another line of research [29] facilitates authorized
users to access only the authorized portion of data,
e.g., a certain range, with a public key scheme. How-
ever, the underlying encryption schemes do not pro-
duce indexable encrypted data. The setting of multi-
dimensional range query in [29] is different from ours.
Their approach requires that the data owner provides
the indices and keys for the server, and authorized
users use the data in the server. While in the cloud
database scenario, the cloud server takes more respon-
sibilities of indexing and query processing. Secure
keyword search on encrypted documents [10], [31], [5]
scans each encrypted document in the database and
finds the documents containing the keyword, which
is more like point search in database. The research on
privacy preserving data mining has discussed multi-
plicative perturbation methods [7], which are similar
to the RASP encryption, but with more emphasis on
preserving the utility for data mining.
8 CONCLUSION
We propose the RASP perturbation approach to host-
ing query services in the cloud, which satisfies the
CPEL criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy,
Efficient query processing, and Low in-house work-
load. The requirement on low in-house workload is a
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computing, and efficient query processing is a key
measure of the quality of query services.
RASP perturbation is a unique composition of OPE,
dimensionality expansion, random noise injection,
and random projection, which provides unique se-
curity features. It aims to preserve the topology of
the queried range in the perturbed space, and allows
to use indices for efficient range query processing.
With the topology-preserving features, we are able to
develop efficient range query services to achieve sub-
linear time complexity of processing queries. We then
develop the kNN query service based on the range
query service. The security of both the perturbed data
and the protected queries is carefully analyzed under
a precisely defined threat model. We also conduct
several sets of experiments to show the efficiency
of query processing and the low cost of in-house
processing.
We will continue our studies on two aspects: (1)
further improve the performance of query processing
for both range queries and kNN queries; (2) formally
analyze the leaked query and access patterns and the
possible effect on both data and query confidentiality.
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9 APPENDIX
9.1 Proofs.
Proving that RASP is not OPE.
Let y = (Eope(x)
T , 1, v)T and we only need to
prove that F (y) = Ay does not preserve the di-
mensional value order. Let f i be the selection vector
(0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) i.e., only the i-th dimension is 1 and
other dimensions are 0. Then, (f i)T y will return the
value at dimension i of y.
Proof: Let A be an invertible matrix with at least
two non-zero entries in each row. For any vector y,
let y′ = Ay. For any two vectors s and t, using the
dimensional selection vector f i, we have s′i = (f
i)TAs
and t′i = (f
i)TAt . If the dimensional order is pre-
served, we will have (si − ti)(s′i − t′i) > 0. However,
(si − ti)(s′i − t′i) = (si − ti)(f i)TA(s− t)
= (si − ti)
k∑
j=1
ai,j(sj − tj), (5)
where ai,j is the i-th row j-th column element of A.
Without loss of generality, let’s assume si > ti (for
si < ti the same proof applies). It is straightforward
to see that the sign of (si − ti)(s′i − t′i) is subject to
the values sj and tj in other dimensions j 6= i. As a
result, RASP does not preserve the dimensional order.
Proving that MBR(MID) encloses MBR(mid).
Proof: In general, the MBR of an arbitrary poly-
hedron can be derived based on the vertices of the
polyhedron. Based on the property of convexity pre-
serving of RASP, a polyhedron is mapped to another
polyhedron in the encrypted space. Concretely, let
a polyhedron P has m vertices {x1, . . . , xm}, which
are mapped to the vertices in the encrypted space:
{y1, . . . , ym}. Then, the upper bound and lower bound
of dimension j of the MBR of the polyhedron in
the encrypted space are determined by max{yij , i =
1 . . .m} and min{yij, i = 1 . . .m}, respectively.
Since we only use MBR to reduce the set of
results for filtering, a slightly larger MBR would
still guarantee the correctness of the MBR based
query processing algorithm, with possibly increased
filtering cost. In the following, we try to find such
a MBR to enclose MBR(mid). By the definition of
the square ranges S(low), S(mid) and S(high), their
vertices have the relationship x
(mid)
i = (x
(low)
i +
x
(high)
i )/2. The images of the vertices are notated
as y
(low)
i , y
(high)
i , and y
(mid)
i , respectively. Corre-
spondingly, the MBR(mid) in the perturbed space
should be found from {y(mid)1 , . . . , y(mid)m }, where
y
(mid)
i = A(x
(mid)
i , 1, v
(mid)
i )
T . Since (y
(low)
i +y
(high)
i )/2
= A(x
(mid)
i , 1, (v
(low)
i + v
(high)
i )/2)
T , and (v
(low)
i +
v
(high)
i )/2 is a valid positive random number. Thus,
MBR(mid) can be determined with vertices {(y(low)i +
y
(high)
i )/2}.
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Let the j-th dimension of MBR(L) represented as
[s
(L)
j,min, s
(L)
j,max], where s
(L)
j,min = min{y(L)ij , i = 1 . . .m},
and s
(L)
j,max = max{y(high)ij , i = 1 . . .m}. Now we
choose the MBR(MID) as follows: for j-th dimension
we use [(s
(low)
j,min + s
(high)
j,min )/2, (s
(low)
j,max + s
(high)
j,max )/2]. We
show that
For two sets of m real values {a1, . . . , am} and
{b1, . . . , bm}, it is easy to verify that
max{a1, . . . , am}+max{b1, . . . , bm} ≥ max{a1+b1, . . . , a1+bm}
(6)
min{a1, . . . , am}+min{b1, . . . , bm} ≤ min{a1+b1, . . . , a1+bm}.
(7)
Thus, (s
(low)
i,min+s
(high)
i,min )/2 ≤ min{(y(low)ij +y(high)ij )/2, i =
1 . . .m} = s(mid)i,min , and (s(low)i,max + s(high)i,max )/2 ≥
s
(mid)
i,max. Since for each dimension, MBR
(MID) encloses
MBR(mid), we have MBR(MID) enclosesMBR(mid).
9.2 Algorithms
Algorithm 1 RASP Data Perturbation
1: RASP Perturb(X,RNG,RIMG,Ko)
2: Input: X : k × n data records, RNG: random real value
generator that draws values from the standard normal
distribution, RIMG : random invertible matrix genera-
tor, Kope: key for OPE Eope; Output: the matrix A
3: A← 0;
4: A3 ← the last column of A;
5: v0 ← 4;
6: while A3 contains zero do
7: generate A with RIMG;
8: end while
9: for each record x in X do
10: v ← v0 − 1;
11: while v < v0 do
12: v ← RNG;
13: end while
14: y ← A((Eope(x,Kope))
T , 1, v)T ;
15: submit y to the server;
16: end for
17: return A;
Algorithm 2 encodes a normal range query and gen-
erate theQi matrices and the MBR for the transformed
query.
In Algorithm 3, the two-stage query processing uses
the MBR to find the initial query result and then fil-
ters the result with the transformed query conditions
yTQiy < 0, where the matrices {Qi} and the MBR are
passed by the client and y is each perturbed record.
The following Algorithm 4 describes the details of
the (K, δ)-Range algorithm for determining the inner
range.
Algorithm 2 RASP Secure Query Transformation.
1: QuadraticQuery(Cond, A)
2: Input: Cond: 2d simple conditions for d-dimensional
data, 2 conditions for each dimension. A:the perturba-
tion matrix. Output: the MBR of the transformed range
and the quadratic query matrices Qi, i = 1 . . . 2d.
3: v0 ← 4;
4: for each condition Ci in Cond do
5: u← zeros(d+ 2, 1);
6: if Ci is like Xj < aj then
7: uj ← 1, ud+1 ← −aj ;
8: end if
9: if Ci is like Xj > aj then
10: uj ← −1, ud+1 ← aj ;
11: end if
12: w ← zeros(d+ 2, 1);
13: wd+2 ← 1;
14: wd+1 ← v0;
15: Qi ← (A
−1)TuwTA−1;
16: end for
17: Use the vertex transformation method to find the MBR
of the transformed queries;
18: return MBR and {Qi, i = 1 . . . 2d};
Algorithm 3 Two-Stage Query Processing.
1: ProcessQuery(MBR, {Qi})
2: Input: MBR: MBR for the transformed query;
{Qi}:filtering conditions; Output: the set of per-
turbed records satisfying the conditions.
3: Y ← use the indexing tree to find answers for
MBR;
4: Y ′ ← ∅;
5: for each record y in Y do
6: success ← 1
7: for each condition Qi do
8: if yTQiy ≥ 0 then
9: success ← 0;
10: break;
11: end if
12: end for
13: if success = 1 then
14: add yi into Y
′;
15: end if
16: end for
17: return Y ′ to the client;
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Algorithm 4 (K, δ)-Range Algorithm
1: procedure (K, δ)-RANGE(L1, Lm, k, δ)
2: high← Lm, low← L1;
3: while high− low ≥ E do
4: mid← (high+ low)/2;
5: num ← number of points in S(mid);
6: if num ≥ k&&num 6 k + δ then
7: Break the loop;
8: else if num > k + delta then
9: high← mid;
10: else
11: low← mid;
12: end if
13: end while
14: return S(mid);
15: end procedure
